For Bertrand Russell, certain convictions are not derived from logical inference or empirical observation but arise spontaneously and compellingly. These convictions, often characterized by their immediacy and lack of conscious justification, form a foundational layer upon which knowledge and reasoned argument are built. Examples of such convictions might include the belief in the existence of an external world, the reliability of memory, or the validity of inductive reasoning. These are accepted not through proof, but through an inherent disposition to trust them.
The role of these fundamental acceptances is crucial in Russell’s philosophical framework. They provide the initial premises for reasoning and the basis for accepting the evidence of the senses. Their importance lies in their enabling function; without some initial trust in basic cognitive faculties, coherent thought and the acquisition of knowledge would be impossible. Historically, examining these foundational tenets has been a recurring theme in epistemology, with philosophers exploring their origin, justification, and potential fallibility.
